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NATIONAL CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
IN HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE PROFESSIONS 
 
ANNUAL LEGAL UPDATE 
 
Developments in the Law of Academic Freedom 
 
Frederick P. Schaffer 
 
I. Secondary Materials 
 
Frederick P. Schaffer, A Guide to Academic Freedom, 
http://www.nacua.org/documents/GuideAcademicFreedom.doc or 
http://www1.cuny.edu/mu/vc_la/2012/01/02/a-guide-to-academic-freedom/ 
Rachel Levinson-Waldman, “Academic Freedom and the Public’s Right to Know: How 
to Counter the Chilling Effect of FOIA Requests on Scholarship, 
http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Levinson_-
_ACS_FOIA_First_Amdmt_Issue_Brief_0.pdf. 
 
II. Cases 
 
 A. Free Speech – Garcetti 
 
  1.  Adams v. Trustees of the University of North Carolina-Wilmington, 640 
F.3d 550(4
th
 Cir. 2011).   
 This is an action brought by an associate professor of criminology alleging 
discrimination based on his religion and exercise of free speech rights, as well as 
retaliation, in connection with the denial of his application for promotion to full 
professor.  The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on all claims.  
The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded. 
Plaintiff’s application for promotion cited some external writings and appearances 
since his religious conversion, in addition to non-refereed publications and informal 
advising to Christian groups.  When his application was denied, he sued.  The district 
court dismissed his claim of religious discrimination on the ground of insufficient 
evidence and the court of appeals affirmed that holding.  The district court also dismissed 
his free speech claims, holding that all of plaintiff’s statements cited in his application for 
promotion were made pursuant to his official duties and therefore enjoyed no First 
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Amendment protection under Garcetti.  The district court reasoned that when plaintiff 
listed his columns, non-scholarly publications and public appearances in his application, 
he implicitly acknowledged that they were made pursuant to his professional duties as a 
faculty member.  The court of appeals reversed on this point, holding that the district 
court had misread Garcetti.  The court summarized its ruling as follows: 
The district court’s decision rests on several fundamental errors including 
its holding that protected speech was converted into unprotected speech 
based on its use after the fact.  In addition, the district court applied 
Garcetti without acknowledging, let along addressing, the clear language 
in that opinion that cases doubt on whether the Garcetti analysis applies in 
the academic context of a public university.  See Garcetti, 547 U.S. 425, 
126 S. Ct. 1951.  Nor did the district court take into consideration the only 
Fourth Circuit case addressing a similar issue, Lee, 484 F.3d at 694 & n. 
11 [where the court applied the Pickering-Connick standard, not Garcetti, 
to a high school teacher’s speech related to classroom teaching]. 
640. F.3d at 561.   
The court of appeals went on to hold, most significantly, that Garcetti does not 
apply in the academic context of a public university under the facts of this case.  Its 
reasoning is worth quoting in full: 
There may be instances in which a public university faculty member’s 
assigned duties include a specific role in declaring or administering 
university policy, as opposed to scholarship or teaching.  In that 
circumstance, Garcetti may apply to the specific instances of the faculty 
member’s speech carrying out those duties.  However, that is clearly not 
the circumstance in the case at bar.  Defendants agree Adams’ speech 
involves scholarship and teaching; indeed,, as we discuss below, that is 
one of the reasons they say Garcetti should apply – because UNCW paid 
Adams to be a scholar and a teacher regardless of the setting for his work.  
But the scholarship and teaching in this case, Adams’speech, was intended 
for and directed at a national or international audience on issues of public 
importance unrelated to any of Adams’ assigned teaching duties at UNCW 
or any other terms of his employment found in the record.  Defendants 
concede none of Adams; speech was undertaken at the direction of 
UNCW, paid for by UNCW, or had any direct application to his UNCW 
duties.   
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Applying Garcetti to the academic work of a public university faculty 
member under the facts of this case could place beyond the reach of First 
Amendment protection many forms of public speech or service a professor 
engaged in during his employment.  That would not appear to be what 
Garcetti intended, nor is it consistent with our long-standing recognition 
that no individual loses his ability to speak as a private citizen by virtue of 
public employment.  In light of the above factors, we will not apply 
Garcetti to the circumstances of this case. 
640 F.3d at 563-64.  The court then went on to explicitly reject defendants’ argument that 
Garcetti should apply because plaintiff’s position as an associate professor required him 
to engage in scholarship, research and service to the community and that the resulting 
statements were therefore pursuant to his official duties.  The court quoted from both the 
majority and dissenting opinions in Garcetti that its holding does not fully account for the 
additional constitutional interests related to academic scholarship or classroom 
instruction.  The court of appeals in Adams therefore concluded: 
Put simply, Adams’ speech was not tied to any more specific or direct 
employee duty than the general concept that professors will engage in 
writing, public appearances, and service within their respective fields.  For 
all the reasons discussed above, that thin thread is insufficient to render 
Adams’ speech “pursuant to [his] official duties: as intended by Garcetti. 
640. F.3d at 564.  Accordingly, the court of appeals went on to state that a review of 
plaintiff’s speech must utilize “the Pickering-Connick analysis for determining whether it 
was that of a public employee, speaking as a citizen upon a matter of public concern.”  Id.  
Its review of the record led the court to the conclusion that plaintiff’s speech was clearly 
that of a citizen speaking on matters of public concern because his columns addressed 
topics such as academic freedom, civil rights, campus culture, sex, feminism, abortion, 
homosexuality, religion and morality.   
Finally, the court of appeals remanded the case to the district court to decide the 
two issues that it had not reached: (1) whether plaintiff’s interest in speaking on matters 
of public concern were outweighed by the government’s interest in providing effective 
and efficient service; and (2) whether plaintiff’s speech was a substantial factor in the 
decision not to promote him.  
B. Discovery of Scholarly Materials 
 
1. United States v. Trustees of Boston College, __ F.Supp.2d __, 2011 
WL 6287967 (D. Mass., Dec. 16, 2011). 
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The court denied the motions of Boston College to quash subpoenas but granted 
its request for an in camera review of the responsive materials.  The subpoenas were 
issued by a commissioner pursuant to the United Kingdom Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaty and sought confidential interviews and records from an oral history project known 
as the “Belfast Project”.   
 
The goal of the project was to document in taped interviews the recollections of 
members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Provisional Sinn Fein, the Ulster 
Volunteer Force and other paramilitary and political organizations involved in the 
“Troubles” in Northern Ireland.  Boston College sponsored the Project, and its agreement 
with the Project director required him, the interviewers and the interviewees to sign a 
confidentiality agreement forbidding them to disclose the existence or scope of the 
Project without the college’s permission.  In addition, In addition, the contract also 
required the adoption of a coding system to maintain the anonymity of the interviewees; 
only the College Librarian and the Project Director would have access to the key.  Each 
interviewee was given a contract guaranteeing confidentiality “to the extent that 
American law allows”.   
 
Much of the opinion is taken up with an analysis of the Treaty and the meaning of 
a federal statute called the Foreign Evidence Request Efficiency Act.  The court 
concluded that under those authorities, it had discretion to review a motion to quash a 
subpoena under a standard of reasonableness, while giving appropriate deference to the 
compelling government interests inherent in the Treaty.  Turning to the countervailing 
interest in confidentiality, the court reaffirmed the prior holdings of the First Circuit, 
which, almost alone among federal circuits, affords protection for confidential academic 
research materials (similar to the limited protection afforded to a reporter’s materials 
from a confidential source).  The court recognized the significant interests on both sides -
- the obligations of the United States under the Treaty and the public’s interest in 
legitimate criminal proceedings, on the one hand, against the Project’s interest in 
confidentiality and the potential chilling effects of disclosure on academic research, on 
the other.  Accordingly, it denied the motion to quash but granted Boston College’s 
request for an in camera reviews of the responsive materials before rendering a final 
decision.   
 
 2. In re Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Marketing, Sales Practices 
and Products Liability Litigation, 2011 WL 5547133 (S.D. Ill., Nov. 15, 2011). 
 
The court denied the motion of Bayer HealthCare Pharmaceuticals to compel 
discovery of certain materials relating to the report of plaintiffs’ expert witness.  (Despite 
the fact that plaintiffs had withdrawn him as a testifying expert, Bayer argued that 
Seventh Circuit precedent required the production.)  The materials in dispute consisted of   
peer review comments of published papers.  The court ruled that the disclosure of peer 
review comments would impose a far greater burden on the academic and scientific 
community than the probative value to the defendant in this case and therefore denied the 
motion to compel. 
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The court’s recognition of the value of peer review is worth quoting in full: 
 
The peer review process is vital to academic quality.  In the 
scientific community, peer review material identifies strengths and 
weaknesses in a researcher’s material.  This helps ensure integrity and 
reliability in scientific activity and reporting. 
 
The pillars of a successful peer review process are confidentiality 
and anonymity; anything less discourages candid discussion and weakens 
the process.  Accordingly, peer review material has traditionally been 
protected from public disclosure. 
 
The court went on to rely on the decision in Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262 
(7
th
 Cir. 1982), where the Seventh Circuit quashed a subpoena issued to university 
researchers seeking research material, including research notes, reports, working papers 
and raw data (but not peer reviews) relating to ongoing studies on the ground that 
disclosure of such materials could interfere with the researchers’ academic freedom and 
could have a chilling effect on scientific research generally.  Interestingly, the court did 
not cite, much less discuss, the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in University of 
Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990), holding that the EEOC did not violate 
academic freedom in requiring a university to turn over confidential peer review 
materials pursuant to a subpoena issued in its investigation of a discrimination claim filed 
by a faculty member who had been denied tenure.   
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